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THE CROCODILE I THE BATHTUB:
An Examination of California’s System for Judicial Selection
By:  Shaun Hoting
In 1986, as the result of an intense, expensive, and
emotionally charged campaign, the Chief Justice of
California’s Supreme Court, Rose Bird, Associate Justice Cruz
Reynoso, and Associate Justice Joseph Grodin were removed
from office.  The removal of the justices was not the result of
malfeasance or criminal behavior on the justices’ part.
Instead, it was the result of capital punishment proponents,
including then-Governor Deukmejian, waging a systematic
campaign against the justices when they were up for reelec-
tion.  This campaign was only possible because California,
like 38 other states, forces judges to face the electorate in
some form of judicial election.  For those 39 states (including
California) that have judicial elections, the elections can be
generally characterized as one of three types: partisan elec-
tions, where the candidates for judicial office run against each
other and use established political party labels; non-partisan
elections, where candidates run against each other without
running under a partisan label; and retention elections, where
a candidate is appointed by the executive, and then faces an
uncontested election with a “yes” or “no” vote for retention in
office.
Like many of the other states, California operates
under multiple judicial selection systems.  For the California
Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal, the California
Constitution provides for uncontested retention elections to take
place during the general election once every 12 years.1 For trial
courts, however, the California Constitution provides that can-
didates engage in a competitive, non-partisan election once
every 6 years.2 This system is substantially different than the
“pure” appointive system that exists in the Federal Judiciary,
wherein all judges are appointed by the president, confirmed by
the Senate, and have lifetime tenure. This raises the question of
why such contrasting systems exist. And, along the same vein,
what are the benefits or drawbacks of California’s system?
This paper will answer these questions by examining
the history of judicial selection methods that developed into
California’s current system.  It will then examine whether
California’s system of judicial selection accomplishes the goal
its proponents argue it is designed to achieve, namely, account-
ability. This examination will take place from a theoretical per-
spective as well as a practical perspective.  Finally, this paper
will analyze several alternative methods of ensuring judicial
accountability and compare them with judicial elections to
determine which, if any, are preferable.3
The debate over how California should select its
judges is not new. At the formation of the United States, debates
over the best method to select judges took place. The history of
this debate in the United States illustrates that some of the ten-
sions inherent in the role of judges are actually tensions
between democracy and constitutionalism, a topic discussed in
Section III, infra.  Expressed in terms common to the debate,
the inherent tension of the judiciary’s role is between accounta-
bility and independence. While an examination of the history of
judicial selection provides some insight into this debate, this
examination also provides context for the adoption of
California’s first system of judicial selection—the popular elec-
tion. The history of judicial selection methods in the United
States and California reveals that once elections become the
chosen method of judicial selection, regardless of the beneficial
nature the elections are believed to impart, they can easily
devolve into emotionally-charged contests that have little to do
with the quality of the judge or the judge’s reasoning, and more
to do with the ultimate outcome of the cases. 
During America’s colonial period, “King George III
retained and exercised the power to appoint and remove
judges.”4 This power was not subject to review, and was exer-
cised at the King’s pleasure.5 “This power was so deeply
resented by the colonists that the Declaration of Independence
lists [this power] among its grievances. . . .”6 Specifically, the
Declaration of Independence states that the subservience of the
judiciary to the King is but one of “a long train of abuses and
usurpations,” as the King of England “has made Judges depend-
ent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries.”7 After declaring their
independence, however, the colonists did not unite around a sin-
gle method for selecting a judiciary.  
Of the original thirteen states, “eight … provided in
their constitutions for the selection of judges by one or both
houses of the legislature.”8 The remaining states permitted
executive appointment of judges, provided that it was con-
curred with by established legislative bodies (referred to as “the
Council”).9 In order to avoid the problem of executive influ-
ence that was seen under King George III, a “majority of the
states provided for lifetime appointments, subject to good
behavior.  Popular elections for judges were[, at this time,]
unheard of.”10
The debates over the proper method for selection of
the federal judiciary were immortalized in the Federalist Papers
and the Constitution. Article III of the United States
Constitution provides that federal judges “would hold office for
life, ‘during good behavior’; that their compensation could not
be diminished while they remained in office; and that they
could be removed only by the relatively unwieldy impeachment
mechanism, and then only for ‘Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.’”11 In writing the Federalist Paper
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That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of
the constitution and of individuals, which we perceive
to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certain-
ly not be expected from judges who hold their offices
by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments,
however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would in
some way or other be fatal to their necessary inde-
pendence. If the power of making them was commit-
ted either to the executive or legislature, there would 
be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch 
which possessed it; if to both, there would be an 
unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to
the people, or to persons chosen by them for the spe-
cial purpose, there would be too great a disposition to
consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing 
would be consulted but the constitution and the 
laws. 12
However, not all of the colonists sup-
ported Hamilton’s views.  Brutus, one of the
“Anti-Federalist” opponents of the Constitution,
believed that the Constitution created a judici-
ary that was too independent.  Brutus stated that
federal judges entrusted with this power would
be placed in an unprecedented situation: they
would “be rendered totally independent, both of
the people and the legislature, both respect to
their offices and their salaries.  No errors they
may commit [could] be corrected by any power
above them. . . nor [could] they be removed
from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudica-
tions.”13 Thus, Brutus “worried that the proposed Constitution
created a government in which the judiciary would rule without
legal or popular restraint.”14 Brutus’ concerns are not without
merit, and have been historically addressed by the federal gov-
ernment in two ways. The first is an appointment process that
requires a majority of the Senate to confirm a judicial candi-
date; the underlying theory of which is to ensure “that those
appointed to the bench have the appropriate character and inde-
pendence of mind.”15 The second way that Brutus’ concerns
have been addressed in the federal government is via various
congressional powers.  Congress has been empowered to
amend the Constitution, impeach judges, remove subject mat-
ters (with limited exception) from the jurisdiction of the feder-
al courts, “to decide how many federal judges there will be . . .,
to appropriate funds for the courts, to enact rules of court pro-
cedure, to create alternative systems of courts under Articles I
and IV, to insulate state court decisions from review, and . . . to
override certain kinds of judicial decisions.” 16
Interestingly, one of Congress’s most powerful meth-
ods of maintaining accountability, impeachment, is not used as
frequently as it could be because it has a relatively high politi-
cal threshold.  In the election of 1800, Thomas Jefferson’s
Democrat-Republican party (often called “Republicans”)
defeated the Federalist party and took control of both houses of
Congress and the Presidency.17 However, “[b]efore the
Republicans took power, the Federalists expanded the size of
the federal judiciary, largely by adding a new system of circuit
courts, and filled all of those new judicial positions with
Federalists.”18 Unsurprisingly, “Jefferson and the Republicans
were outraged, and Jefferson hinted early on that action might
have to be taken.”19 Republicans then began impeaching
Federalist judges. After impeaching John Pickering, the
Republicans “set their sights on the most hated of Federalist
judges, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase.”20 Instead of
focusing on the misdeeds of Justice Chase, the Republicans
focused on using “the impeachment effort . . . as a means of
removing Federalists simply because of disagreement with their
decisions and their political views . . . .”21 However, the “idea
of impeaching judges because of their political views was too
much even for a solidly Republican Senate to bear.”22 Thus,
despite the language in the Constitution stating that “Judges . .
. shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,”23 it was not
this or any other Constitutional provision that prevented the
Republicans from successfully impeaching Justice Chase, but
rather the lack of political will.24
In the decades following the adop-
tion of the Constitution, development of judicial
selection procedures amongst the states took a
decidedly different path.  Unlike the adherence
to the relatively strict judicial independence
model espoused by the U.S. Constitution, the
states’ constitutions took several different
approaches to judicial selection. The reasons for
these departures from the federal model are
uncertain; however, the reasons appear to
include the inherent distrust of the judiciary,
participation in politics by western-frontier set-
tlers, the emergence of populism as a political movement, judi-
cial corruption, and the then-recent decision of Marbury v.
Madison.25
The Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury that estab-
lished judicial review of legislation, while hailed today as the
cornerstone of American constitutional jurisprudence, was
poorly received in 1803.26 After Marbury, Thomas Jefferson,
who had supported life tenure for the judiciary before becom-
ing President, “argued … that judicial terms should be limited
to six years, and that judges should be elected by the people.”27
Indeed, Jefferson’s criticism of the judiciary post-Marbury has
been said to have “contributed materially to the distrust of the
judiciary, and to the idea that popular election of judges for
short terms was feasible and desirable.”28
It is, however, believed that Andrew Jackson’s new
populism, “that preached voter control over all aspects of gov-
ernment, including the judiciary,”29 was the factor that con-
tributed the most to states adopting election as the preferred
method of judicial selection.30 In response to this movement,
“most states which had provided for the appointment of judges
with lifetime tenure amended their constitutions to provide for
selection of judges either through election or appointment.
Judges would be awarded fixed terms subject to elections in
which the incumbent judge could be challenged by an opponent
on the ballot.”31 Thus, states that entered the union after
Andrew Jackson’s presidency often adopted this populist
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California was one of many states that entered the
Union during the era of Jacksonian populism. Accordingly,
“California’s first constitution provided for the popular election
of judges.  No other method of judicial selection had [even]
been considered in [California’s] Constitutional Convention of
1849.”34 California’s method of selecting judges remained the
same until 1879.35 Unlike the Constitutional Convention of
1849, however, California’s 1879 Constitutional Convention
contained a “heated debate” about whether California should
change its method of selecting judges from election to appoint-
ment. This debate was silenced when the measure was defeated
by workingmen’s delegates.36 California’s story does not end
here, however.
Several decades later, on December 11, 1912, the issue
of judicial selection reemerged in a meeting of the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. At that time, members
of the Commonwealth Club (henceforth, “the Club”) were
“generally conservative in their political and economic out-
look,” a majority were “Republicans, and the average wealth
[was] well above the norm.”37 At the December 11th meeting,
the Club discussed possible methods to shorten the time it took
for cases to go to trial. As an aside to the general meeting, the
debate brought the “general agreement that the difficulties in
the administration of justice were to be found in the qualifica-
tions of judges, rather than in the provisions of the codes.”38
After coming to this conclusion, the Club passed “a resolution
asking the Club’s Board of Governors to organize a section to
formulate some method of securing an appointive system for
judges.”39
The committee of the Club that subsequently met on
May 13, 1914, reported that judges should be selected through
appointment. The Club subsequently concluded that the most
appropriate method of selection was appointment by the gover-
nor, and confirmation by the legislature.  Based on its conclu-
sions, the Club proposed an amendment to California’s
Constitution. This amendment, which was “subsequently
known as the Chandler Amendment, was introduced in the leg-
islature of 1915.”40 Although the Chandler Amendment was
favorably reported to the Senate, it ultimately failed to pass.
According to Malcom Smith:
Opposition to the Chandler Amendment developed 
when it was discovered that one of its provisions made
it necessary for the governor either to renominate an 
incumbent judge for a six-year term, or to select his 
successor, placing all incumbent judges at the mercy 
of the governor.41
Revised versions of the Chandler Amendment were
submitted in 1921 and 1927.  Both times, the Assembly failed
to pass the amendment, taking no action on it in 1921, and
defeating it in committee in 1927.  In 1929, despite the “limit-
ed use of pressure tactics” and the “endorsement of the reorgan-
ized State Bar Association of California,” the Club’s plan was
again defeated in committee.42
The Club’s defeats can be attributed to pressure from
diverse groups.  Some members of the California State Bar
opposed a change because they believed that they had a better
chance of becoming a judge under an elective, rather than an
appointive system.43 Organized labor also opposed the Club’s
plan.  Organized labor had recently been subject to numerous
injunctions and court orders, and the group feared it would lose
its power as a voting block to oust a judge who ruled against the
group.44 To overcome the pressure of these special interests, the
Club “discussed the possibility of submitting its plan to the vot-
ers by means of an initiative petition.”45 The State Bar opposed
this possibility, and the Club’s efforts to persuade the legislature
were again defeated in 1931.46
As the numerous defeats caused the Club’s interest in
judicial selection to diminish, the interest of the State Bar in
judicial selection began to increase.  In 1932, two events
spurred an interest within the bar to reform California’s method
of selecting judges. The first was the “work of the Los Angeles
Bar Association, following the recall of several superior court
judges in Los Angeles County.”47 The second event was the
report of a vote of bar members taken on the subject of judicial
selection by a professor at Boalt Hall, revealing dissatisfaction
with the method of judicial selection.48
After the creation of special committees and the subse-
quent reports by the committees, the State Bar submitted a pro-
posal to the legislature titled “Assembly Constitutional
Amendment No. 98” (“the Bar Amendment”).49 The substance
of the Bar Amendment called for appointment of judges by the
governor from a list of candidates crafted by a nominating com-
mission. The proposed commission would “consist of the chief
justice of the Supreme Court, the presiding justice of the district
court of appeal . . . and the state senator for the county in which
the appointment would be made.”50 The Bar Amendment also
provided that superior court judges would serve from four to six
years (an extension over the previous rules).  Significantly, the
Bar Amendment, like the proposed amendments offered by the
Club, provided for retention elections; i.e., at the expiration of
his or her term, the judge would run unopposed for a strict “yes”
or “no” vote from the electorate.51 If a majority of the electorate
voted “no” in the judge’s retention election, the governor would
then appoint a successor.52
The Bar Amendment was well received by the legisla-
ture. After introduction in the Assembly, the Bar Amendment
was amended to only apply to counties of more than 1.5 million
people. The purpose of this revision was to confine the Bar
Amendment’s application to Los Angeles County.53Afterward,
the Bar Amendment passed the Assembly; and, despite a brief
attempt to bury it in committee, the Senate passed the Bar
Amendment.54 Thus, at the end of 1933, the State Bar had
accomplished in one year what the Club could not accomplish
over eighteen years:  judicial selection reform passing through
the legislature and being submitted to the electorate for a vote.
The voters, however, still had to accept the Bar Amendment at
the next general election, which was over a year away.
During the years 1933 and 1934, before the November
1934 election that contained the proposed Bar Amendment,
California suffered from a crime wave that caused voters to
demand legislative action. The legislature responded.  In 1934,
to consolidate the work of several independent groups, a
statewide committee was formed. The committee was called the
“California Committee on Better Administration of Law,” (“the
Statewide Committee”) and “its task was to draft legislation 
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that would ‘curb crime in California’”55 Two other groups were
set up to assist the Statewide Committee: the “Committee on
Better Administration of Justice of the California State
Chamber of Commerce,” and a committee which consisted
“entirely of members of the bar,” which “acted as the statewide
committee’s advisory body.”56
The Statewide Committee considered propositions
from study groups and ultimately supported four measures that
were to appear on the ballot as proposed initiative constitution-
al amendments.57 One of the four proposals pertained to the
“[s]election of judges and confirmation by vote of the people”
(this proposal, along with the other three are, henceforth, “the
Proposal”).58 The Statewide Committee did not determine who
would select the judges, or for how long they would serve.59
The Statewide Committee decided to use the initiative
petition to pass the Proposal instead of submitting their meas-
ures to the legislature for two reasons.  First, “[m]ost of the pro-
posed changes had already been before the legislature at one
time or another; and (2) The people would still have to ratify the
constitutional amendments even if they were passed by the leg-
islature.”60 The changes could not be ratified until two years
later, at the general election in November 1936.  However, if the
Statewide Committee placed the Proposal on the ballot for the
November 1934 election, it would sit opposed to the Bar
Amendment, which had already passed through the legislature.
Since the Bar Amendment was developed earlier, and had been
campaigned for throughout the State, some of the Statewide
Committee members felt that the Bar Amendment was more
likely to be adopted.61 Other Statewide Committee members,
however, felt voters might support the Proposal “if it were pre-
sented to [the voters] as part of a comprehensive ‘package’
arrangement.”62 The Statewide Committee thus decided that
the judicial selection proposal should still be included in the
Proposal offered to the voters.
Given that the Statewide Committee planned to pro-
ceed with the judicial selection proposal, the Statewide
Committee needed to determine precisely how judges should be
selected under the Proposal.  Initially, the Statewide Committee
supported lifetime tenure for judges, yet, several of the
Statewide Committee’s members, such as Earl Warren, did not
want to allow the current judges to be “blanketed in” if the
Proposal passed.  One of the members proposed a method under
which all of the sitting judges could run for a retention election,
and, if retained, would have lifetime tenure.63 However, the
Statewide Committee was aware that this life-tenure provision
would be problematic for the voters. Accordingly, the Statewide
Committee modified their proposal for judicial selection. The
modified proposal on judicial selection provided for:
(1) Appointment by the governor from a list of two 
names; (2) A nominating board composed of the chief
justice of the Supreme Court, the senior presiding 
justice of the district court of appeal, and the attorney
general; and, (3) Tenure for life if the voters retained 
the judge after one term of twelve years, the judge to 
run against his record rather than against an oppene-
nent.64
In February 1934, the Club intervened.  Mr. Perry
Evans, a member of the Club, addressed a dinner meeting of the
entire membership of the Statewide Committee. Although he
(and, by proxy, the Club) agreed that an appointive judiciary
was desirable, Mr. Evans argued that the retention elections that
took place after a candidate was appointed by the Governor
should not give the judge lifetime tenure.65 Instead, Mr. Evans
advocated that the retention elections should be for renewable
twelve-year terms instead of lifetime tenure.   Mr. Evans argued
that this plan combined the best features of both election and
appointment processes.66Mr. Evans was able to convince many
in the audience, including Earl Warren.
When it met a few days later, the Statewide Committee
altered its judicial selection proposal by replacing the nominat-
ing board with “a reviewing board, thus enabling the governor
to appoint anyone he wished, subject to the board’s approval.”67
Additionally, the Statewide Committee included a provision
that would allow individual counties to decide whether to adopt
an elective or appointive system for the county’s superior court
judges. 
After enlisting several groups, including the California
Federation of Women’s Clubs and the League of Women Voters,
to obtain the requisite number of signatures, the Proposal was
placed on the ballot for the November 1934 election.  In order
for the judicial selection proposal, referred to as “Proposition
No. 3” on the ballot, to gain support, the Statewide Committee
had to demonstrate how the process of judicial selection was
linked to crime. They argued that:  reduction of crime requires
high-quality administration of justice; administration of justice
can be improved by placing the most qualified individuals on
the bench; Proposition No. 3 was the best combination of
appointive and elective methods to ensure the selection of the
best judges; therefore, Proposition No. 3 ensures high quality of
administration of justice, resulting in the reduction of crime.68
The Statewide Committee’s campaign proved successful. All
four of the individual proposals, that together, created “the
Proposal”, passed. The Bar Amendment, however, which was
also on the November 1934 ballot, did not pass.
After its passage, Proposition No. 3 was incorporated
into the California Constitution as Section 26.  Just two years
later, in 1936, “the voters had an opportunity to test the opera-
tion of the new constitutional amendment.”69 One Supreme
Court Justice and five Court of Appeals Justices were up for
retention; all six Justices were retained.  
Interestingly, under the popular election system pre-
Proposition No. 3, the governor still appointed close to eighty
percent of all judges. This is because, when a sitting judge
retired or passed away before the end of his or her term, the
elections system permitted the governor to appoint replacement
judges. As a result, the “principal effect of [Proposition No. 3]
was to impose a limitation upon the governor by subjecting his
appointments to review by the Commission on
Qualifications.”70 
The first judicial defeat after the passage of
Proposition No. 3 came during the term of Governor Culbert L.
Olson.  On June 10, 1940, Governor Olson nominated Professor
Max Radin of the University of California Law School as an
associate justice on the California Supreme Court.   Professor
Radin, a politically liberal individual, on one occasion “wrote a
letter of protest to a trial judge regarding the dubious conviction
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conviction of three members of a maritime federation for the
murder of an engineer.”72 At the time, then-District Attorney
Earl Warren viewed this Professor Radin’s letter as “unwarrant-
ed and indiscreet.”73
On June 26th, the Commission on Qualifications
received Professor Radin’s nomination. The Commission con-
sisted of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, the
Presiding Justice of the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, and Earl Warren, then-Attorney General of of
California.  Despite support from Justice Frankfurter of the U.S.
Supreme Court and two justices from the Ninth Circuit, the
Commission refused to confirm Professor Radin’s appointment.
While this may have been the first defeat under California’s
new method of judicial selection, it was not the last, and it
would not be the most memorable.
In February 1972, five years before the arrival of Rose
Bird, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Anderson,74
held that California’s death penalty violated the state’s constitu-
tional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.75 Almost
immediately thereafter, in the 1972 elections, California passed
Proposition 17.76 Proposition 17 amended California’s
Constitution stating, “[t]he death penalty provided for under
[existing death-penalty] statutes shall not be deemed to be, or to
constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments with-
in the meaning of [the California Constitution].”77 The decision
in People v. Anderson was one of many78 that resulted from
“judicial doctrines initially set forth by a series of progressive
chief justices since 1940.”79 Up to this point, many controver-
sial decisions had 
been defended by a broad spectrum of politicians on 
the ground that what the courts ordered was the law 
and deserved support even if the substance of the deci-
sion were distasteful.  As time went on, however, polit-
ical leaders tended to defend particular decisions only
if they agreed with the result. As a consequence, the 
California [Supreme Court] became identified with the
liberal side of the political spectrum, and attacking the
court became easier for the extreme right as moderates
[withdrew] from the debate.80
Unfortunately, Rose Bird joined the California Supreme Court
precisely during this political change. 
In 1975, Jerry Brown succeeded Ronald Reagan as
Governor of California. When Governor Brown took office,
Rose Elizabeth Bird, an active member of Governor Brown’s
gubernatorial campaign, became a member of Governor
Brown’s cabinet.81 In 1977, Chief Justice Wright retired from
the California Supreme Court, opening a vacancy for Governor
Brown to fill.  Governor Brown “nominated Bird to fill the
vacancy, and her appointment was confirmed by a two-to-one
vote of the Judicial Appointments Commission.”82 The ensuing
political change, combined with “Chief Justice Bird’s position
in the inner circle of the Governor, the Governor’s attacks upon
the establishment, the split vote on the confirming commission,
and Chief Justice Bird’s minimal experience at the bar” focused
close attention to the court.83
From the beginning of Chief Justice Bird’s tenure, she
was seen as difficult to work with, disrespectful of past Chief
Justices, withdrawn, and overly partisan.84 When she came up
for her initial retention election in 1978, she was “confirmed
with a bare majority, under 52%, the narrowest majority on
record at that time.”85During this same election, California vot-
ers again demonstrated their commitment to capital punishment
by passing the “Briggs death penalty initiative”; an act that
effectively broadened California’s capital punishment regime.86
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Bird over the next eight
years, the California Supreme Court took a “liberal” stance on
numerous issues, but none were as contentious as the Court’s
stance on capital punishment.87
During Chief Justice Bird’s tenure, the California
Supreme Court “reviewed seventy-one death penalty convic-
tions by automatic appeal between 1977 and 1986.  In only four
of these cases were the convictions or death sentences
upheld.”88 Unsurprisingly, the 94% reversal rate caused a sig-
nificant outcry from capital punishment supporters.  In 1986,
this left Chief Justice Bird and two other “ultra-liberal” mem-
bers of the court, Justices Reynoso and Grodin, “in vulnerable
positions as the . . . retention election approached.”89 Chief
Justice Bird was particularly vulnerable “because of her record
of dissents from the few opinions affirming death penalties and
her penchant to write separate, and at times extreme, opinions
in important cases where she was not the author of the majori-
ty opinion.”90 
Although the Chief Justice’s rulings pertaining to cap-
ital punishment made her politically vulnerable in her 1986
retention election, her rulings were not the only cause for her
opposition. The state Republican Party, which, at that time, was
“able to elect Republican nominees for President equally with
the Democratic Party . . . had reason to believe that the court
had become an instrument of Democratic politics.”91
Additionally, a perception resonated that the liberal justices on
the court, including Chief Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso
and Grodin, treated the court’s “function as that of achieving a
political agenda, and a partisan one at that.”92 This view was
compounded by the fact that a large portion of opinion writing
was done not by the justices, but by staff attorneys who were
perceived to write opinions that justified the justices’ desired
outcomes.93 Thus, entering into the 1986 election, opposition to
the justices existed across a wide spectrum.
This included the state Republican Party, Republican Governor
Deukmejian, others who viewed the court as a Democratically
partisan body, proponents of capital punishment including
numerous district attorneys, and members of the legal commu-
nity who believed in traditional notions of judicial decision
making.94
Given the position of the state Republican Party, it is
unsurprising that Governor Deukmejian was also opposed to
Chief Justice Bird and was an active participant in the campaign
to unseat her.  Initially, however, the Governor was not commit-
ted to unseating Justices Reynoso and Grodin.  During the 1986
elections Governor Deukmejian 
publicly warned Justices Grodin and Reynoso he 
would oppose them in their retention elections unless 
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they voted to uphold more death sentences. When 
asked by reporters if he would endorse Grodin and 
Reynoso if they began affirming death penalty 
cases, Deukmejian replied, “It would certainly help
a lot.” Apparently dissatisfied with Grodin's and 
Reynoso if they began affirming death penalty 
cases, Deukmejian replied, “It would certainly help
a lot.”Apparently dissatisfied with Grodin's and 
Reynoso's responses to his warnings, Deukmejian 
opposed them….95
Over the course of the campaign, the opposition to
the justices spent approximately $6.6 million, much of which
came from small donations by individuals.96 Larger dona-
tions were also received from agricultural and business inter-
ests that viewed the justices as being “anti-business.”97
Supporters of the justices spent approximately $4 million.
The justices’ largest supporters came from within the plain-
tiff’s bar, many of whom worked on contingency fees and
benefited from the court’s recent tort decisions.98
The tenor of the campaign was extremely negative
and has been described as a “blatant appeal to emotion and
desire for revenge.”99 The opposition campaign engaged in a
two-pronged attack:
First, it emphasized the undisputed proposition that
despite the number of years since the California 
Constitution had been amended to expressly author
ize the death penalty, there had been no executions
in the state. Then, in a constantly repeated series of
television spots, many times spotlighting relatives 
of murder victims, it graphically depicted the cir-
cumstances of the crime, concluding with the state-
ment that the death penalty imposed upon the defen-
dant had been reversed.100
By comparison, supporters of the justices attempted to per-
suade voters that the justices reached their conclusions “by
law . . . that [their] ideologies played no part in the process,”
and their opposition consisted of “right wing extremists” and
“right wing bully boys.”101 In the end, although the oppo-
sition was initially focused on Chief Justice Bird, the cam-
paigns of the other justices were submerged in the pro- and
anti-Bird debate.  Ultimately, after the campaigns were
waged, and the votes tallied, “none of the elections were
even close.”102 Voters rejected Chief Justice Bird  by 66%,
Justice Reynoso by 60%, and Justice Grodin by 57%.103
After the defeat of Chief Justice Bird and Justices
Reynoso and Grodin, Governor Deukmejian elevated his for-
mer law partner, Justice Malcom M. Lucas, to the position of
Chief Justice, and appointed three new associate justices:
John A. Arguelles, David N. Eagleson, and Marcus M.
Kaufman.104 The change in the court’s treatment of the death
penalty was dramatic.  Over the next nine years, between
1987 and “late 1995, the Lucas court upheld eighty-five per-
cent of the 212 death penalty convictions it reviewed.
The errors the Bird Court justices determined were
‘reversible’ were usually regarded as ‘harmless’ by the Lucas
Court justices.”105
The history of judicial selection in the United States
demonstrates that the initial struggle over the proper method
for selecting judges involved debates between independence
and accountability.  However, California’s history of judicial
selection demonstrates how regardless of whether the chosen
system attempts to balance the independence of judges with
the need for accountability, judges can quickly become the
subjects of emotionally charged campaigns. These cam-
paigns have more to do with the displeasure of a portion of
the electorate because of the disposition of a particular case
or issue than the competence of the judge or the judge’s rea-
soning. The attempt to remove a judge to secure an outcome
of a case appears to completely contradict the notions of
judicial independence. To be sure, there is little dispute that
by making judges face elections, be they retention elections
such as California’s, partisan elections, or non-partisan elec-
tions, such elections sacrifice a degree of judicial independ-
ence in order to achieve the desired accountability.
However, to determine whether elections are an unjustifiable
reduction of the independence of the judiciary for the sake of
accountability to the electorate, the terms “independence”
and “accountability” need to be properly defined and exam-
ined.
In a characteristically simple, humorous, and ele-
gant comment, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals expressed the difficulty in defining inde-
pendence:
What does it really mean to be judicially independ-
ent? I've often considered the question of what 
would happen if one day I decided to show my inde-
pendence by getting on the bench dressed like 
Ronald McDonald. I don't really like the traditional
black robe--I think it's kind of stupid-looking--and 
it would be much nicer to have orange hair. Would 
that prove my judicial independence?106
Judge Kozinski’s comments, while perhaps somewhat
extreme, serve to highlight the core of the problem: what
does it actually mean for a judge to be independent?
Unsurprisingly, scholars have defined independence in sev-
eral different ways:
[The ability of judges to be free] from political pres-
sures and public outcry in order to settle disputes 
between parties fairly. 
[T]he degree to which judges believe they can 
decide and do decide consistent with their own per-
sonal attitudes, values and conceptions of judicial 
role (in their interpretation of the law) . . . in oppo-
sition to what others, who have or are believed to 
have political or judicial power, think about or 
desire in like matters, and . . . particularly when a 
decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those 
with political or judicial power may bring some ret-
ribution on the judge personally or on the power of
the court.
[The ability of judges not to] make decisions on the
basis of the sorts of political factors (for example, 
the electoral strength of the people affected by a 
decision) that would influence and in most cases 
control the decision were it to be made by a legisla-
tive body such as the U.S. Congress.[T]he right of judges to be free from inappropriate 
control by others in the exercise of judicial decision
making.107
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What is Independence, and What does it Achieve?  
The common thread in all of these definitions is that independ-
ence exists when judges who are impartial to the parties of a
dispute are permitted to act on their own “sincerely-held prefer-
ences…without fear of facing reprisals from the public or the
political regime.”108 The next structural question is:  why is it
important for judges to be independent?
There are two primary reasons that judicial independ-
ence is important: legitimacy and Constitutionalism. To under-
stand how independence results in legitimacy, one need only
look at the purpose of a court.  “[W]hen two parties come into
[a] conflict that they cannot resolve themselves, common sense
leads them to seek the assistance of a third party to help them
achieve a resolution—triadic dispute resolution.” 109 Under
this rubric, the “third party” is the court.  If the triadic dispute
resolver’s neutrality is questionable, then this appearance of
partiality can erode the system’s legitimacy, causing the losing
party in the triadic dispute to contest the results and question the
validity of using the third party as a method for dispute resolu-
tion. Thus, “the appearance of an impartial judiciary will pro-
duce public confidence in the judiciary and build legitimacy for
the institution.”110 While the mere appearance of impartiality
can lead to legitimacy,111 actual impartiality can also achieve
legitimacy while providing for a “normative good.”112 Using
the definition of independence discussed above, an independent
judge may utilize his or her freedom from fear of the public or
political regimes’ reprisals. Thus, the judge is more likely to
actually be impartial, which gives the judge the appearance of
impartiality that, in turn, generates legitimacy. 
The second and perhaps most important reason for
judicial independence is Constitutionalism.  Constitutionalism
is a check on the democracy that is rooted in part, “in a fear of
the consequences of majoritarian rule.”113 Under Constituti-
onalism, there are certain areas in which the majority “pos-
sesses no immediate control. These [areas] are designated as
‘rights,’ and the individual is said to ‘possess’ these rights
‘against’ the majority, which is to say, against encroachment
by majoritarian power.”114 The United States Constitution and
the Bill of Rights are “designed to protect individual citizens
and groups against certain decisions that a majority of citizens
might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it
takes to be the general or common interest.” Perhaps the most
eloquent articulation of this principle came from Justice
Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
where he stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles 
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights 
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the out-
come of no elections.116
Although the Constitution clearly protects these rights,
Constitutionalism raises another question: what, or whose inter-
pretation of the Constitution and the rights enumerated therein
will society regard as authoritative? Alexander Hamilton argued
the judiciary should be the “authoritative interpreter of the
Constitution on the grounds that the judiciary’s independence
renders it uniquely suitable for that role.”117 This role was con-
firmed when Justice Marshall famously stated in Marbury v.
Madison, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is.”118 Given that the sub-
sequent reluctant acceptance of this decision by the body-politic
meant that the judiciary could now authoritatively interpret the
Constitution, the question remained whether the judiciary
should be independent.  
As previously mentioned, in Federalist 78, Alexander
Hamilton stated, “[p]eriodical appointments, however regulat-
ed, or by whomsoever made, would in some way or other be
fatal to [judges’] necessary independence.”119 Hamilton con-
tinued:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the constitution and the rights of individuals 
from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunc-
tures, sometimes disseminate among the people them-
selves, and which,… have a tendency…to occasion 
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community.120
Alexander Hamilton clearly believed judicial inde-
pendence functioned as a necessary means for the protection of
Constitutional rights.121 Several others shared Hamilton’s view.
In a letter written in June 1776, Thomas Jefferson said:
The dignity and stability of government in all its 
branches, the morals of the people, and every blessing
of society, depend so much upon an upright and skill-
ful administration of justice, that the judicial power 
ought to be distinct from both the legislature and exec-
utive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a 
check upon both, as both should be checks upon that.
The judges, therefore,…should not be dependent upon
any man, or body of men.122
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 expressed this opinion
by stating: 
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every
individual, his life, liberty, property, and character, that
there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and 
administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen
to be tried by judges as free, impartial, and independ-
ent as the lot of humanity will admit.123
Chief Justice John Marshall, who wrote the opinion in
Marbury, espoused the same view in 1829 when he stated: “The
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an
ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or
a dependent Judiciary.”124More recently, Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist succinctly stated the issue when he noted that
“[t]he independence of [the judiciary]… is every bit as impor-
tant in securing the recognition of the rights granted by the
Constitution as is the declaration of those rights themselves.”125
Clearly judicial independence accomplishes two
important tasks.  First, judicial independence contributes to the
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legitimacy of the court.  Second, judicial independence serves
to protect the principle of Constitutionalism; i.e., protecting cer-
tain individual rights from infringement by the transient major-
ity.  “Accountability” effectively runs contrary to both of the
principles established by judicial independence.
Unlike independence, accountability can be more eas-
ily defined.126 Put simply, accountability is a response to the
counter-majoritarian difficulty created by judicial independ-
ence. The term “counter-majoritarian difficulty” comes from
Lexander M. Bickel’s book, The Least Dangerous Branch, in
which he states:  “The root difficulty is that judicial review is a 
counter-majoritarian force in our system.  [W]hen the Supreme
Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of
an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not [o]n
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.”127 Thus, in
theory, judicial “accountability” serves as a response to deci-
sions the prevailing majority believe are too far outside the
realm of acceptable decisions.  By creating a system whereby
the political majority can remove those judges who make such
decisions, the belief is that this resolves the counter-majoritari-
an difficulty.
Note, however, that for accountability to truly be an
appropriate response to the counter-majoritarian difficulty pre-
sented by judicial independence, the people to whom the judi-
ciary are accountable must represent the majority.  If this is the
goal of accountability, the question, therefore becomes whether
judicial elections serve to accomplish this goal. An examination
reveals, quite simply, that these elections do not accomplish this
goal and instead serve to malign the independence of the judi-
ciary without holding them accountable to a majority of the
electorate.128 
The lack of information held by the voters creates the
first problem inherent in judicial elections. This comes from
both the “supply side” and the “demand side.”  “On the supply
side legal constraints, ethical obligations, and professional
norms restrict the extent to which judicial candidates can sup-
ply potential voters with information about themselves.”129 In
other words, unlike their opposition who can make virtually any
claim or promise, judicial candidates cannot promise a result to
the electorate; to do so would violate judicial ethics and would
demonstrate an impermissible bias.  
“On the demand side voters have traditionally had
very little incentive to gather information about judicial candi-
dates,” for three reasons.130 First, individual voters are not like-
ly to appear before the judge up for election. Accordingly, a
self-interested voter has little incentive to vote for a candidate
because it is unlikely that the candidate’s views will directly
affect the voter.131 Second, courts are inherently reactive
devices; they cannot choose the matters before them132 and, as
such, they are extremely limited in their ability to control poli-
cy. This compounds the lack of incentive for a self-interested
voter to vote. Third, the information related to judicial decisions
is relatively complex to a voter not trained in the legal profes-
sion.133 Although a background in law is not necessarily
required, such a background substantially aids the voter in
understanding the point of law the judge is discussing, and the
underlying reasons for the outcome.  For the average voter, the
time required to understand the judicial opinions is likely to dis-
suade the voter from attempting to obtain all of the relevant
information. Thus, the information necessary to make a deci-
sion about a judicial candidate is overly time-consuming to
obtain, is relatively limited in scope, and is unlikely to affect the
self-interest of the voter.134 
The second problem with judicial elections is voter
“roll off” or “drop off.”   For elections to truly provide account-
ability to the majority, voters must participate.
The evidence shows, however, that this is not the case.  “From
1948 to 1974, voter turnout in judicial elections, measured as
the percentage of persons of voting age casting ballots,
was…38.2% in retention elections.”135 Moreover, even when
judicial elections coincided with general elections, as is
required for California Supreme Court and Appellate Court
retention elections, the voter roll-off was 59.8%.136 Kurt
Scheurman defines “roll-off”, “as the percentage of voters cast-
ing ballots in the major partisan race of an election who also
cast ballots for the state judicial election.”137
Thus, because of the “roll-off” phenomenon, more than 40% of
those voters who cast a ballot failed to vote for any state judi-
cial candidate.138 Given the low voter turnout even in general
elections, and the substantial rate of voters who failed to vote
for a state judicial candidate, it appears that elections enable a
minority of the electorate to hold judges “accountable.”
To test this theory, data from two years will be examined.
The first year examined is 1986, the year that Chief
Justice Rose Bird and others were defeated.  In 1986, 43.4% of
those voters who were eligible to vote actually voted.139 Of
those who voted, 66% voted against Chief Justice Bird. Thus, a
maximum of 28.64% of those eligible to vote in California
removed Chief Justice Bird from office.140 Moreover, the
actual number of voters is lower, because the rate of “roll-off”
is unknown.  Note, however, that because of the intensity of the
campaign in 1986, the roll-off rate was significant; i.e., the
intensity of the campaign meant that those who voted in the
general election also voted in the heavily contested judicial
elections.141
The second year examined is 2004, which is, at the
time of this writing, the most recent general election.  In 2004,
59.2% of those voters who were eligible to vote actually
voted.142 If the roll-off rate of 59.8% is applied, then only an
estimated 35.4% of the voters cast votes for state judicial can-
didates, which means that, in judicial retention campaigns, it is
possible for 17.8% of the electorate to determine the out-
come.143
These results lead to the conclusion that judicial elec-
tions, in particular, create a situation in which the “majority”
expressed by the total number of votes is not reflective of the
majority of the populace, but of a minority group.
Accordingly, if accountability is defined as a solution to the
counter-majoritarian problem, then the control over the judici-
ary by a minority of the populace fails to solve the counter-
majoritarian problem; instead, it replaces the minority group
exerting its will on the judiciary with a minority of the elec-
torate.
Assume, for the moment, that elections did, in fact
reflect the will of the majority. These elective judiciaries would
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still pose two fundamental problems for a system based, in part,
on Constitutionalism.  “First, the rights of individuals and
unpopular minority groups may be compromised....
Second…the impartial administration of ‘day-to-day’ justice
may be compromised” as well.144 If the outcomes of the judi-
cial elections are dependent on the attitudes of a majority of the
electorate, the elected judiciary could easily compromise the
rights of individuals.145 If a judge believes that a majority of
the electorate opposes the judge “vindicatin-
some…constitutional right when its violation is suffered by
some disfavored minority group,” the judge will be left with
two options, vindicate the right, or let the will of a majority of
the electorate govern.146 If the judge vindicates the right of the
minority, finding “against the majority,” the next retention elec-
tion may remove the judge from office.  “Over time, this phe-
nomenon would create a systematic bias in favor of judges most
responsive” to the pressures of the majority.147 Alternatively, a
judge who wants to be retained in the next election and who is
aware of the majority’s preference now has an incentive to act
strategically. To increase his chances of retention by the major-
ity at the next retention election, the judge could “compromise
the constitutional rights of subsets of their judicial electorate
who are unpopular, unorganized, or otherwise outvoted.”148
These actions are fundamentally at odds with the nature of
Constitutionalism and the Bill of Rights, which, in the words of
Justice Jackson, are designed “to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”149
An elective system affects more than just the
Constitutional rights of a minority; it also affects the “day-to-
day” administration of justice.  Criminal sentencing exemplifies
this effect. Assume for the moment that an appellate justice
must determine if the case warrants the trial court’s sentence.
The justice has the discretion to consider “such factors as the
number and type of past convictions, the severity of the way the
particular offense was committed, and the character of the con-
victed. . .” to determine if the trial court abused its discre-
tion150. Under an elective system, the justice may decide to
demonstrate her “tough posture toward crime and thus…win
favor from the majority whose continued favor is a necessary
condition for reelection.”151 The justice’s action demonstrates a
lack of independence, and, ultimately, undercuts the legitimacy
of the courts.
Thus, as has been demonstrated, the current system of
retention elections does not generate accountability to the
majority of the electorate, and, therefore, does not resolve the
counter-majoritarian difficulty.  Moreover, even assuming that
the current system of retention elections did generate accounta-
bility to the majority, the nature of the retention elections virtu-
ally ensures infringement of the Constitutional rights of minor-
ity groups, and will hamper the day-to-day administration of
justice. These results have led Judge Peter Webster to note that,
given the numerous alternatives to elections that would proper-
ly respond to the counter-majoritarian difficulty it becomes
clear that one who says he or she “wants judges to be more
‘accountable’ actually means that one wants judges who will
decide cases the way he or she thinks they should be decid-
ed.”152
The debate between independence and accountability,
represented by retention elections, while intriguing, may be
entirely irrelevant if the pressures associated with the election
are unnoticed by the judges.  In other words, does the fact that
the judge will have to face an election actually inject itself into
the judge’s decision making? After examining the statistical and
anecdotal evidence, the answer is a definitive “yes.”
One example of the “real-world” effects of
California’s system can be inferred from the events just before
the 1986 campaign to remove Chief Justice Bird and others.  In
addition to Chief Justice Bird, and Justices Reynoso and
Grodin, Justice Stanley Mosk was also on the 1986 ballot.
Initially, like Bird, Reynoso, and Grodin, Justice Mosk was
“targeted for defeat by the organized opposition in early
1986….”153 And, even though Justice Mosk had “voted to
overturn death sentences in the past, he also voted to uphold the
sentences in 14 of 15 capital cases decided between December
1985 and October 1986.”154 When a reporter from the Los
Angeles Times questioned Justice Mosk about his votes in these
capital cases, Justice Mosk stated that “his death penalty deci-
sions had not ‘changed significantly’ over the years, but rather
‘the bugs and flaws in the 1978 death penalty law’ had gradual-
ly been eliminated by the court, thereby making it easier to
affirm capital sentences.”155 Initially, Justice Mosk’s explana-
tion appears credible. A closer examination, however, reveals
that the timing of Mosk’s revelation that the “bugs and flaws”
of California’s capital punishment system had been eliminated
is, to say the least, curious.  One need only look at the court’s
1984 and 1985 terms, as well as the 1989 and 1990 terms, to
discover this discrepancy.
In 1984 and 1985, Justice Mosk cast votes in thirty-
three death penalty cases.  Unlike his 1986 term (including
December 1985), where Justice Mosk voted to uphold a death
sentence 93% of the time (14 of 15 cases), in the 1984 and 1985
terms, Justice Mosk voted to uphold a death sentence only
48.5% of the time (16 of 33 cases)156. The difference between
the time periods is substantial.  Justice Mosk was almost twice
as likely to uphold a death sentence during 1986, an election
year, than the two years immediately prior. To borrow from a
colloquialism, it appears that Justice Mosk saw the “writing on
the wall;” i.e., this statistical evidence gives strong support to
the notion that Justice Mosk changed his voting behavior when
it became clear that significant opposition was mounting
against his fellow justices for failing to affirm death penalty
sentences.  
Such a move could have been the result of strategic
behavior on the part of Justice Mosk.  During 1984 and 1985,
four other justices rarely, if ever, upheld capital sentences.
Justice Mosk was likely aware that Justices Reynoso, Grodin,
Broussard, and Chief Justice Bird, almost never voted to affirm
a death sentence.157 Thus, even if Justice Mosk wanted to
reverse a death sentence, he would have been able to vote to
uphold it, thereby ensuring his retention in the upcoming elec-
tion, but the votes of the four anti-death penalty justices would
reverse the sentence. Whether Justice Mosk actually engaged in
this strategic behavior, or, whether he, in fact, became satisfied
with California’s death penalty scheme just before the start of
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an election year is unknown.  Nevertheless, Justice Mosk’s voting
record does lend support to the inference that the impending elec-
tions substantially changed his decisions.
There is yet another factor that supports the inference that
Justice Mosk was behaving strategically, or that the upcoming elec-
tion otherwise influenced his vote.  Professor Nicholas
Georgakopoulos conducted a survey that compared the death
penalty decisions of all of the justices on the California Supreme
Court from 1984-85 to those from 1989-90.158As previously men-
tioned, in 1984-85, Justice Mosk voted to affirm the death penalty
48.5% of the time.  During the election year of 1986, Justice
Mosk’s affirmed death sentences 93% of the time.  If Justice Mosk
allowed the upcoming elections to affect his decisions in death
penalty cases, one would expect that the rate of affirmance would
decrease after the election. This is, in fact, precisely what hap-
pened.  In 1989-90, Justice Mosk cast votes in fifty-two death
penalty cases, in only 21 of which did he vote to
affirm the death sentence, a rate of 40.4%.159.
Again, while it is possible that there are viable
alternative reasons for Justice Mosk’s voting pat-
tern, none are readily apparent.  Moreover, Justice
Mosk’s 1989-90 death sentence affirmance rate
casts doubt on his assertion that he affirmed 14 of
15 death sentences during a heated election year
because he felt the “bugs and flaws” in
California’s death penalty scheme had been elimi-
nated.
Besides Justice Mosk, there were only two other justices
of the California Supreme Court that were present during the 1984-
85 and 1989-90 time periods:  Justices Lucas and Broussard. An
examination of their voting patterns for death sentences reveals that
the election of 1986 influenced them as well.  During 1984-85,
Justice Lucas cast votes in twenty death penalty cases;160 he
affirmed the death sentence in 12 of those cases, for an affirmance
rate of 60%.  During 1989-90, Justice Lucas voted in fifty-two
cases, and affirmed the death sentence in 44 of those cases, for an
affirmance rate of 84.6%.  Justice Lucas’ rise in death sentence
affirmance rates supports the inference that he too was influenced
by the 1986 elections.  However, unlike the other justices men-
tioned here, during the Bird Court, Justice Lucas displayed sub-
stantial support for death sentences. The question therefore
becomes whether Justice Lucas was constraining his support
beforehand and believed that the elections implicitly authorized
him to uphold more death sentences (i.e., he “could” uphold more
death sentences if he wanted to), or whether the 1986 elections
were a mandate from the voters that he “should” uphold more
death sentences. Although both inferences are plausible, the author
of the study, Professor Georgakopoulos, suggests it is the former.
Specifically, Professor Georgakopoulos argues that Justice Lucas’
opinions reflect a justice who was, before the 1986 election, con-
strained by the precedent set during the Bird Court, but, after the
election, was willing to overturn the constraining precedent.161
Although Justice Lucas’ increase in affirmance rates was
substantial, it was not the most dramatic change amongst the three
justices.  During 1984-85, Justice Broussard voted in thirty-three
cases; he did not affirm the death sentence in a single case.162
During 1989-90, however, Justice Broussard voted in fifty-two
cases, and affirmed the death sentence in 21 of those cases, for an
affirmance rate of 40.4%.  Professor Georgakopoulos suggests that
this dramatic change was because Justice Broussard was keenly
aware of the post-Bird court’s support for the death penalty.
As such, Justice Broussard was “[g]oing along with the majority
[to] create good will that Broussard could use in other instances, or,
by agreeing with the majority, [Broussard] could influence the
writing of the majority opinion so that it might take a more lenient
tone than if he had stayed in the minority.”163Although Professor
Georgakopoulos’ inference is plausible, these statistics also support
an alternative inference:  that the 1986 elections influenced Justice
Broussard’s decisions in death penalty cases and his votes reflect a
desire to avoid being targeted for defeat in his next retention elec-
tion.
In a more expansive examination, Professor Gerald F.
Uelmen conducted a study “correlating death
penalty affirmance rates for all state supreme
courts for the ten year period ending in 1987, with
the manner of judicial selection used for the jus-
tices on those courts.”164 Professor Uelmen
found that those states that used executive appoint-
ment, with no elections, had an average death sen-
tence affirmance rate of 26.3%; those that used
uncontested retention elections, such as California,
had an average affirmance rate of 55.3%; those
with non-partisan and partisan elections, 62.9%
and 62.5%, respectively; and those with legislative elections had an
affirmance rate of 63.7%.165 Professor Uelmen concluded that his
findings “suggest that judges whose tenure is more secure are more
willing to overturn a death penalty judgment.”166
Beyond the statistical evidence, there is also anecdotal
evidence suggesting that retention elections have a “real-world”
effect on judicial decision making and, thus, on judicial independ-
ence.  One such example is the “Korean grocer case” in Los
Angeles.  In the “Korean grocer case” Latasha Harlins, a fifteen-
year-old African American, entered Soon Ja Du’s grocery store.167
Du accused Harlins of shoplifting and Harlins began to assault
Du.168 Du then shot and killed Harlins as Harlins walked away.169
The jury convicted Du of voluntary manslaughter and Superior
Court Judge Joyce A. Karlin sentenced Du, to five years’ proba-
tion.170 “The sentence was considered unusually lenient by seg-
ments of the public,” and public outcry “led to a campaign to defeat
Judge Karlin in her impending reelection bid.”171 The campaign
was unsuccessful, and Judge Karlin was reelected.  However, the
systematic influence of the campaign to defeat Judge Karlin could
still be seen.  During the campaign, “one of her judicial colleagues
reportedly reportedly remarked off the record: straight probation
because I don’t want to be the next Joyce Karlin.’”172
In 1996, in a slightly different event, Justice Penny White
of the Tennessee Supreme Court was defeated in a retention elec-
tion in which her opponent distorted White’s record on the death
penalty, implying that she was “soft on crime.”173 “Shortly after
[White’s] defeat, Tenessee Governor Don Sundquist said:  “Should
a judge [when making decisions] look over his shoulder [worried]
about whether [he is] going to be thrown out of office?  I hope 
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so.”174 In this frontal attack on judicial independence, the
Governor clearly intends to ensure that each time a judge makes
a decision he or she considers election pressures.  If the defeat
of Justice White combined with the Governor’s statement did
not influence judges at every level of the courts in Tennessee, it
would be surprising. 
Perhaps the most colorful example comes from Justice
Otto Kaus of the California Supreme Court. When asked if an
upcoming election had ever influenced his decisions, Justice
Kaus stated:
[T]o this day, I don't know to what extent I was sub-
liminally motivated by the thing you could not forget-
that it might do you some good politically to vote one
way or the other . . . . When you're eating dinner with
a gorilla, it's hard to make small talk, even when he's 
using the right knife and fork . . . .”175 
Judge Kaus later generally described the dilemma judges face
when deciding controversial cases while facing a retention elec-
tion, “comparing it to ‘finding a crocodile in your bathtub when
you go in to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you
try not to think about it, but it's hard to think about much else
while you're shaving.’”176 Judge Kaus made this now-famous
comment in 1985, the year before Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth
Bird, Justice Cruz Reynoso, and Justice Joseph Grodin were
denied retention for their decisions on the death penalty.177
The statistics and anecdotal evidence confirm that
elections do, in fact, influence judicial decision making.
Moreover, elections as a method of resolving the counter-
majoritarian difficulty fail because they do not properly hold the
judiciary accountable to the majority.  Instead, judicial elec-
tions, due to a lack of information, diminished voter turn-out,
and voter “roll-off,” hold the judiciary accountable to a small
minority of voters.  Even if elections represented the majority
of the electorate, the effect that they have on judicial independ-
ence serves to undercut the legitimacy of the court system as a
whole, and sacrifices one of the founding principles of this
republic, Constitutionalism.  Ultimately,  it is clear that elec-
tions are not an appropriate judicial selection method.178
This leaves the question open of how a democratic and
constitutionally based society can hold a judge to some degree
of accountability, thus attempting to resolve the counter-majori-
tarian difficulty, without infringing upon the judge’s independ-
ence. There are numerous methods available, including statuto-
ry amendment, constitutional amendment, courts of appeal, dis-
ciplinary measures, and, ultimately, impeachment.  Statutory
amendment is the most direct method of resolving the counter-
majoritarian difficulty.  If a judge interprets or applies a statute
in a method that the majority dislikes, the majority, via initiative
(in California) or the legislature can amend the statute to clari-
fy the precise method of interpretation or application.
An example of this type of behavior can be seen on the federal
level with the national “Do-Not-Call List.”  On September 24,
2003, Federal District Judge Lee West ruled that the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) did not have authority to operate
the Do-Not-Call registry.179 The very next day, Congress
passed legislation granting the FTC the authority to operate the
registry; President Bush signed the bill the following
Monday.180 This process is even simpler in California, where
action by the legislature is not required because the California
Constitution provides voters a right to pass laws on their own
through the referendum process.181
The same analysis can be applied if a judge finds that
an agency action or statute is invalid because it violates the
California state constitution.182 Similar to the referendum
process, the California Constitution can be amended by placing
an initiative measure on the ballot to be voted on in the next
election.183 For the initiative measure to pass, it must be
approved by a majority of the votes; a “super-majority” is not
required.184 Thus, if the position taken by groups claiming to
represent the “majority,” is, in fact, the opinion of a majority of
the electorate, then initiative will have a substantial chance at
success.  Unfortunately, this method suffers from voter turnout.
As previously mentioned, in 2004, the last general election in
California at the time of this writing, voter turnout was only
59.2%,185 indicating that it would still be possible for a minor-
ity to exert control over the majority, thereby shifting the count-
er-majoritarian difficulty from the judges to the minority.
Although problematic, there are two reasons why this solution
is preferable to judicial elections.  First, assuming for the
moment that just over 50% of the population who actually voted
did vote for the constitutional amendment, and that voter
turnout was 59.2%, this means the amendment would pass with
the support of only 30% of the electorate.  If the remaining 70%
truly objected to the amendment, it could be repealed or other-
wise amended in the next election.  If, however, the other 70%
did not object, then one can infer that the majority does, in fact,
support the amendment on some level.186 The second reason
that this method is preferable to judicial elections is because this
method prevents the judge from having to incorporate his or her
chances of reelection into making decisions, thereby preventing
infringement of the judge’s independence. Thus, this method
provides some alleviation of the counter-majoritarian difficulty,
without infringing on the independence of the judiciary. 
Appellate courts provide an alternative method to
challenge an undesirable lower-court decision.  Unlike the pre-
vious alternatives to judicial selection mentioned, appeals
courts serve to constrain lower courts to a universe of accept-
able decisions.  In this sense, judges are held accountable by
virtue of the fact that if a decision is outside the universe of
acceptable decisions it will be corrected by the appeals court.
Moreover, even though this method of “accountability” does
constrain the judge and thereby reduce his independence, it
does not hamper the judge’s ability to perform his duties. In
other words, appellate courts effectively control lower-court
judges without subjecting judges to possible recall in the event
that they make an opinion that is outside the universe of accept-




does not provide a resolution to the counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty, as the majority never has direct opportunity to exert its
will.187
The last two alternatives, impeachment and discipli-
nary measures are relatively intertwined and will be discussed
together.  Disciplinary measures and impeachment, much like
appellate courts, constrain judges by providing two universes of
acceptable decisions, with the disciplinary measures universe
being a subset of the impeachment universe.  However, discipli-
nary measures and impeachment differ from appellate courts in
that the potential universe of acceptable decisions is substantial-
ly larger.188 Under a disciplinary scheme, a special committee
created for such matters could discipline a judge who exceeded
his or her judicial authority. The following is an
example of a possible model for such a discipli-
nary system.
Under this proposed disciplinary
scheme, the committee would have the power to
issue formal and informal reprimands, to sus-
pend judges without pay, and to remove cases
from the judges calendar—a particularly useful
tool if the judge appears to express a substantial
bias against a particular party.  Finally, in the
event of extreme cases of judicial malfeasance,
the committee could refer matters to the legisla-
ture for possible impeachment hearings. These
impeachment hearings would be in cases of
criminal conduct, or other, similar behavior.
Additionally, impeachment hearings would, like the federal sys-
tem, require more than a simple majority to remove the judge;
a two-thirds majority vote of the senate would be required.
Like the disciplinary procedures above, these impeachment
proceedings serve to allow the majority, via their elected repre-
sentatives, to exert some influence over judges in extreme cases
of malfeasance.  In so doing, this scheme does hinder judicial
independence to some degree by potentially forcing the judge to
suffer personal consequences for his or her decisions.
However, by operating only at the outskirts of judicial behavior,
and by requiring more than a simple majority vote for removal,
these proceedings would minimize the aforementioned hin-
drance on judicial independence. 
Interestingly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the
analysis of these alternatives leads to the conclusion that elec-
tions are the minority’s preferred method of holding judges
accountable. To demonstrate why this is a preferred method,
compare judicial elections with either California’s referendum
system or initiative measure system. All three of these systems
allow for “direct” accountability to voters by permitting a
majority of voters to determine whether to remove a judge,
amend the law, or amend the Constitution.  In the general elec-
tion, a minority of the electorate, 17.79%, can remove a judge
from office.189 This modest percentage is the result of low voter
turnout combined with significant voter “roll-off.”  By contrast,
in the same general election, with the same voter turnout, but
because of voter roll-off, a proposed referendum or initiative
measure would require 29.66% of the vote to pass.190
Thus, a judge’s opponents need 40% fewer votes to remove a
judge from office than they do to change the law the judge inter-
preted.  It is therefore a substantially simpler process for a dis-
pleased minority to remove a judge than to change the law.
Moreover, as discussed in Section III(c), supra, the conse-
quence of removal does affect judicial decision making, indicat-
ing that the next judge to face the displeased minority may be
less likely to rule against them.
Note also that, from a structural perspective, judicial
elections seem to negate the need for constitutionalism, and,
thus, a constitution. As previously mentioned, the Constitution
and Bill of Rights are “designed to protect individual citizens
and groups against certain decisions that a majority of citizens
might want to make, even when that majority
acts in what it takes to be the general or com-
mon interest.”191 Since judges are the inter-
preters of the constitution, direct election of
judges, be it via a non-partisan or a retention
election, effectively allows the transient majori-
ty to control who interprets the constitution.  By
controlling who interprets the constitution, the
transient majority can effectively control how
the judges interpret the constitution. Therefore,
through judicial elections, the transient majority
is able to subject constitutional interpretation to
a majority vote, which, in turn, minimizes any
protections the constitution may have provided
to individual citizens and groups that are at odds with the
desires of the transient majority. Thus, judicial elections effec-
tively negate the need for a constitution.
Unfortunately, despite the numerous defects that exist
within judicial election systems, the scholarly support for their
reform, and the support for reform from numerous Federal and
State judges, judicial elections appear to be rising, albeit slow-
ly.  In 1906, judicial election rates were around 80%. Today, the
figure is 89%.192 Disturbingly, 76% of voters and 26% of state
court judges “believe that campaign contributions made to
judges have at least some influence on [the judges’] deci-
sions.”193 This statistic demonstrates that voters and judges
alike believe that elections affect judicial independence. And,
because of the nature of courts as triadic dispute resolution sys-
tems, the electorate’s belief that judges are not independent
poses a fundamental threat to the legitimacy of the courts as a
whole.  Reform is, therefore, imperative. To borrow from
Justice Kaus’ metaphor, given the apparent propensity of the
electorate for judicial elections, we may never be able to com-
pletely remove the crocodile from the bathtub, but hopefully,
through reform and political courage, we can minimize its bite. 
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